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POLIOE SOIENCE NOTES-
Scientific Determination of Alco- a sample of urine will not render
holic I ntoxication-T h e Supreme the doctor's analysis inadmissible."
Court of Arizona in the recent de- According to the doctor's testi-
cision of State v. Duguid, 72 Pac. mony the analysis of the defen-
(2d) 435 (Ariz., 1937), had occa- dant's urine indicated the presence
sion to pass upon the admissibility of "two milligrams of ethyl alco-
of the results of a urine analysis hol per cubic centimeter of urine."
made for the purpose of determin- The doctor explained how this
ing whether the defendant was much alcohol would affect a per-
under the influence of intoxicating son: "There are four ordinary
liquor while driving upon the pub- standards which we use to deter-
lic highways of Arizona, as was mine drunkenness, depending upon
charged by the State in its prose- the amount of alcohol which we
cution for the offense, recover in the urine or blood. This
After the defendant's arrest he ranges from one to four or five
was taken to a clinical laboratory milligrams per cubic centimeter.
where a physician made a chem- One milligram, a patient may be
ical analysis for ethyl alcohol in drunk, but decently so. Two mil-
the defendant's urine, a specimen ligrams, distinctly drunk. Three
of which he furnished the doctor. milligrams, usually drunk and dis-
Upon the trial the physician testi- orderly. And four milligrams or
fled as to the results of the analysis. more, dead drunk."
The defendant objected, and con- In connection with this decision
tended that the admission of this the reader is referred to the fol-
evidence compelled him to give lowing article which appeared in a
evidence against himself in viola- previous issue of this Journal, and
tion of his constitutional privilege particularly to that section of the
against self-incrimination. The article dealing with the admissibil-
evidence introduced at the trial in- ity in evidence of the results of
dicated that the urine specimen tests for alcoholic intoxication:
was given upon request. Upon Inbau, F. E., "Self-Incrimination-
appeal the Supreme Court of Ari- What Can an Accused Person Be
zona ruled adversely to the de- Compelled to Do?", 28 J. Criminal
fendant's contention. The opinion L. and Crim. 261-93 at pp. 288-293
of the appellate court stated: "This (1937).
evidence shows respondent acted
under no compulsion but freely
and voluntarily. Under such cir- Photography - Admissibility of
cumstances there can be no doubt Sound Movie of Accused Person Mak-
of the admissibility of the doctor's ing a Criminal Confession-Dur in g
findings. The fact that the re- the course of the trial of People v.
spondent may not have known why Hayes, 71 Pac. (2d) 321 (Cal. App.,
he was asked to give (the doctor) 1937), involving a prosecuting for
* Edited by Fred E. Inbau and M. Edwin O'Neill of the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory, Northwestern University School of Law.
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manslaughter, the court permitted
a sound motion picture of the de-
fendant making a confession to be
received as competent evidence.
In objecting to the admissibility
of this evidence the defendant con-
tended that it constituted a viola-
tion of his right to be confronted
by witnesses against him; of the
right to cross-examine the wit-
nesses who testified against him; of
the privileges and immunities se-
cured to him by the constitution
of the state of California; and fur-
ther, that the sound movie con-
stituted "unsworn testimony, hear-
say evidence, compelled him to be
a witness against himself, and
deprived him of due process of
law."
In approving of the trial court's
ruling in admitting this evidence
the appellate court said: "If after
a preliminary examination, the
trial judge is satisfied that a sound
moving picture reproduces accu-
rately that which has been said and
done, and the other requirements
relative to the admissibility of a
confession are present i. e., it was
freely and voluntarily made with-
out hope of immunity or promise
of reward, then, not only should
the preliminary foundation and the
sound moving picture go to the
jury, but in keeping with the policy
of the courts to avail themselves
of each and every aid of science
for the purpose of ascertaining the
truth, such practice is to be com-
mended as of inestimable value to
triers of fact in reaching accurate
conclusions.
"This particular case well illus-
trates the advantage to be gained
by courts utilizing modern methods
of science in ascertaining facts.
The objection is frequently heard
in criminal trials that a defendant's
confession has not been freely and
voluntarily made, he testifying that
it was induced either by threats or
force or under the hope or promise
of immunity or reward, which is
denied by witnesses on behalf of
the People. When a confession is
presented by means of a movietone
the trial court is enabled to deter-
mine more accurately the truth c"
falsity of such claims and rule
accordingly."
Admissibility of Wire Tapping
Evidence-The Supreme Court of
the United States on Dec. 30, 1937,
in the case of Nardone v. U. S., 58
Sup. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 258, reversed
a decision of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals and held, con-
trary to the Circuit Court's ruling,
that the evidence obtained by fed-
eral officers in this case involving
a tapping of telephone wires carry-
ing interstate messages was inad-
missible. (The decision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was noted
in the last issue of this Journal.)
The Supreme Court held (with
two justices dissenting) that in
view of the provisions of the Com-
munications Act of June 19, 1934,
no evidence procurred by a fed-
eral officer in tapping interstate
telephone wires could be used in a
criminal prosecution. Section 605
of the Communications Act pro-
vides that no person who, as an
employee, has anything to do with
the sending of any interstate com-
munication by wire shall divulge
or publish it or its substance to
anyone other than the addressee or
his authorized representative, or to
authorized fellow employees, save
in response to a subpoena issued
by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, or on demand of other lawful
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authority; and that no person not
being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication
and divulge or publish the ex-
istence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect or meaning of such in-
tercepted communication to any
person. In interpreting this pro-
vision Justice Roberts stated in the
Supreme Court's opinion: "Taken
at face value the phrase 'no per-
son' comprehends federal agents,
and the ban on communications to
'any person' bars testimony to the
contents of an intercepted mes-
sage." The government had con-
tended that Congress did not in-
tend to prohibit authorized federal
agents from tapping telephone
wires to procure evidence. But the
Court said: "We nevertheless face
the fact that the plain words of
-Section 605 forbid anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to in-
tercept a telephone message, and
direct in equally clear language
that 'no person' shall divulge or
publish the message or its sub-
stance to 'any person'."
